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Abstract
We propose a formal model of trust informed by the Global
Computing scenario and focusing on the aspects of trust
formation, evolution, and propagation. The model is based
on a novel notion of trust structures which, building on con-
cepts from trust management and domain theory, feature at
the same time a trust and an information partial order.
Introduction
Global Computing (GC) is an emerging aspect of computer
science and technology. A GC system is composed of enti-
ties which are autonomous, decentralised, mobile, dynam-
ically conﬁgurable, and capable of operating under partial
information. Such systems, as e.g. the Internet, become eas-
ily very complex, and bring forward once again the need to
guarantee security properties. Traditional security mecha-
nisms, however, have severe limitations in this setting, as
they are often either too weak to safeguard against the ac-
tual risks, or so stringent to impose unacceptable burdens on
the effectiveness and ﬂexibility of the infrastructure. Trust
management systems, whereby safety critical decision are
made based on trust policies and their deployment in the
presence of partial knowledge, have an important role to
play in GC.
This paper focuses on the foundations of formal models
for trust in GC-like environments, capable of underpinning
the use of trust-based security mechanisms as an alternative
to the traditional ones.
Trust is a fundamental concept in human behaviour, and
has enabled collaboration between humans and organisa-
tions for millennia. The ultimate aim of our research on
trust-based systems is to transfer such forms of collabora-
tion to modern computing scenarios. There will clearly be
differences between the informal notion of trust explored
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in the social sciences and the kind of formality needed for
computing. Mainly, our models need in the end to be op-
erational, so as to be implementable as part of GC systems.
Equally important is their role in providing a formal under-
standing of how trust is formed from complex interactions
between individuals, so as to support reasoning about prop-
erties of trust-based systems.
Although our notion of trusted entity intends to cover
only computing entities – even though of variable nature,
spanning from soft to hard devices of all sorts – familiarity
with trust models from the social sciences is a good start-
ing point for our search of a foundational, comprehensive
formal model of trust. One of our main sources has been
the work by McKnight and Chervany [15], who provide a
typology of trust used to classify existing research on trust
in domains like sociology, psychology, management, eco-
nomics, and political sciences. Trust is thereby classiﬁed
conceptually in six categories: disposition, when entity a
is naturally inclined to trust; situation, when a trusts a par-
ticular scenario; structure, when a trusts impersonally the
structure b is part of; belief, when a believes b is trustwor-
thy; intention, when a is willing to depend on b; behaviour,
when a voluntarily depends on b. Orthogonally, the notion
of trustee is classiﬁed in categories, the most relevant of
which decree that b is trusted because of its competence,
benevolence, integrity,o rpredictability. We believe that a
good mathematical model of computational trust should be
capable of expressing all such aspects, as well as further
notions of primary relevance in computing, e.g. that trust
information is time dependent and, in general, varies very
rapidly. Also, it should be sufﬁciently general to allow com-
plex structures representing combinations of different types
of trust.
We think of the standard deployment of a trust manage-
ment system as consisting of a “trust engine”a n da“ risk
engine” coupled together as part of a “principal.” The trust
engine is responsible for updating trust information based
on direct and indirect observations or evidence, and to pro-
videtrustinformationtotheriskengineasinputtoitsproce-
dures for handling requests. The risk engine will feed back
information on principals’ behaviours as updating input to
the trust engine. Abstracting over this point of view, we
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of trust formation, evolution,a n dpropagation. The latter is
particularly important in our intended application domain,
where the set of active principals is large and open-ended,
and centralised trust and ad-hoc methods of propagation of
its variations make little sense. An important propagation
mechanism is delegation, whereby principals cooperate to
implement complex, intertwined “global” trusting schemes.
Just to pin down the idea, bank b may be willing to trust
client c to an overdraft limit x only if bank b  trusts it at
least up to 2x/3, and c itself does not trust d, a crook known
to b. Delegation has important consequences for trust repre-
sentation, because it brings forward the idea of trust policy,
i.e. algorithmic rules – such as bank b’s above – to evalu-
ate trust requests. In principle, trust among principals can
be represented straightforwardly, as a function from pairs of
principals to trust levels,
GTrust : Principal −→ Principal −→ TrustDegree
where GTrust(a) is a function which associates to each
principal b the value of a’s trust in b. Delegation leads to
model local policies, say b’s, as functions
TrustPolicy : GTrust −→ Principal −→ TrustDegree
where the ﬁrst argument is (a representation of) a universal
trust function that b needs, to know b ’s level of trust in c
and whether or not c trusts d.
The domain of TrustPolicy makes the core of the issue
clear: we are now entangled in a “web of trust,” whereby
each local policy makes reference to other principals’ local
policies. Technically, this means that policies are deﬁned
by mutual recursion, and global trust is the function deter-
mined collectively by the web of policies, the function that
stitches them all together. This amounts to say that GTrust
is the least ﬁxpoint of the universal set of local policies, a
fact ﬁrst noticed in [21] which leads straight to domain the-
ory [19]. Domains are kinds of partially ordered sets which
underpin the semantic theory of programming languages
and have therefore been studied extensively. Working with
domains allows us to use a rich and well-established the-
ory of ﬁxpoints to develop a theory of security policies, as
well as ﬂexible constructions to build structured trust do-
mains out of basic ones. This is precisely context and the
speciﬁc contribution of this paper, which introduces a novel
domain-like structure, the trust structures, to assign mean-
ing and compute trust functions in a GC scenario. We an-
ticipate that, in due time, techniques based on such theories
will ﬁnd their way as part of trust engines.
As domains are (complete) partial orders and trust de-
grees naturally come equipped with an ordering relation
(actually a lattice structure), a possible way forward is to
apply the ﬁxpoint theory to TrustDegree viewed as a do-
main. This is indeed the way of [21] and, as we motivate
below, it is not a viable route for GC. There are very many
reasons in a dynamic “web of trust” why a principal a try-
ing to query b about c may not get the information it needs:
b may be temporarily ofﬂine, or in the process of updating
its policy, or experiencing a network delay, or perhaps un-
willing to talk to a. Unfortunately, the ﬁxpoint approach
would in such cases evaluate the degree of trust of a in c to
be the lowest trust level, and this decision would be wrong.
It would yield the wrong semantics. Principal a should not
distrust c, but accept that it has not yet had enough infor-
mation to make a decision about c. What is worse with this
confusion of “trust” with “knowledge,” is that the informa-
tion from b could then become available a few milliseconds
after a’s possibly wrong decision.
We counter this problem by maintaining two distinct or-
der structures on trust values: a trust ordering and an infor-
mation ordering. The former represents the degree of trust-
worthiness, with a least element representing, say, absolute
distrust, and a greatest element representing absolute trust;
the latter the degree of precision of trust information, with
a least element representing no knowledge and a greatest
element representing certainty. The domain-theoretic order
used to compute the global trust function is the information
order. Its key conceptual contribution is to introduce a no-
tion of “uncertainty” in the trust value principals obtain by
evaluating their policies. Its technical contribution is to pro-
vide for the “semantically right” ﬁxpoint to be computed.
Following this lead, we introduce and study trust struc-
tures of the kind (D, , ), where the two order relations
over the set D, carry the meaning illustrated above. We
then provide constructions on trust structures – including
an “interval” construction which endows complete lattices
with a natural notion of uncertainty and lifts them to trust
structures – and use the results to interpret a toy, yet signiﬁ-
cant policy language. We believe that introducing the infor-
mation ordering alongside the trust ordering is a signiﬁcant
step towards a model of trust feasible in a GC scenario; it
is a major point of departure from the work of Weeks [21],
and the central contribution of this paper.
Plan of the document. In §1 we deﬁne our trust model
along the lines illustrated above, whilst §2 focuses on trust
structures, providing methods for constructing useful struc-
tures as well as a general method to add uncertainty to the
model. In §3 we introduce a policy language and use our
trust structure to give it a denotational semantics.
Related Work. Trust is a pervasive notion, thoroughly
studied in a variety of different ﬁelds, including social sci-
ences, economics and philosophy. Here we only survey re-
cent work on trust as a subject in computing; the reader is
referred to [15] for a broader interpretation. A detailed sur-
vey can be found in Grandison and Sloman’s [9].
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building. In [18], Rivest et al. describe SDSI, a public key
infrastructure featuring a decentralised name space which
allows principals to create their own local names to re-
fer to other principals’ keys and in general, names. El-
lison et al. [8] proposed a variation of the model which
contributes ﬂexible means to specify authorisation policies.
The proposals are now merged in a single approach, dubbed
SPKI/SDSI. Other systems of practical relevance include
PGP [24], based on keys signed by trusted certiﬁcating
authorities; KeyNote [2], which provides a single, uniﬁed
language for both local policies and credential containing
predicates to describe the trusted actions granted by (the
holders of) speciﬁc public keys; and REFEREE [5], which
uses a tri-valued logic which enriches the booleans with a
value unknown. Trust in the framework of mobile agents
is discussed e.g. in [22]. Delegation plays a relevant rˆ ole
in trust-based distributed systems. A classiﬁcation of dele-
gation schemes is proposed by Ding et al. [7], where they
discuss implementation and analyse appropriate protocols.
The ideas expressed in [7] lie at a level different from ours,
as their focus is exclusively on access control.
The theoretical work can be broadly divided in two main
streams: logics, where the trust engine is responsible for
constructing [4, 3, 11, 12, 13] or checking [1] a proof that
the desired request is valid; and computational models [21,
6], like our approach.
Burrows et al. propose the BAN logic [4], a language for
expressing properties of and reasoning about the authentica-
tion process between two entities. The language is founded
on cryptographic reasoning with logical operators dealing
with notions of shared keys, public keys, encrypted state-
ments, secrets, nonce freshness and statement jurisdiction.
In[3], Abadietal.enhancethelanguagebyintroducingdel-
egation and groups of principals: each principal can have
a particular role in particular actions. The Authorisation
Speciﬁcation Language (ASL) by Jajodia et al. [11] sepa-
rates explicitly policies and basic mechanisms, so as to al-
low a more ﬂexible approach to the speciﬁcation and imple-
mentation of trust systems. ASL supports also role-based
access control.
Modal logics have a relevant place in specifying trust
models, and have been used to express possibility, neces-
sity, belief, knowledge, temporal progression, and more.
Jones and Firozabadi [12] address the issue of reliability of
agents’ transmissions using a modal logic of actions [16]
to model agents. Rangan [17] views a distributed sys-
tem as a collection of communicating agents in which an
agent’s state is the history of its messages. Rangan’s model
builds on simple trust statements to deﬁne simple prop-
erties, which are then used to specify systems and anal-
yse them with respect to properties of interest. Recently,
Jøsang [13] proposed a logic of uncertain probabilities, a
work which is related to our interval construction and can
be recast as an instance of it in our framework. Speciﬁcally,
Jøsang considers intervals of belief and disbelief over real
numbers between 0 and 1.
Concerning computational models, Weeks [21] provides
a model based on ﬁxpoint computations which is of great
relevance to our work. Winsborough and Li [23] study au-
tomated trust negotiation, an approach to regulate the ex-
change of sensitive credentials in untrusted environments.
Clarke et al. [6] provide an algorithm for “certiﬁcate chain
discovery”inSPKI/SDSIwherebyprincipalsbuildcoherent
chains of certiﬁcates to request and grant trust-based access
to resources.
1 A Model for Trust
The introduction has singled out the traits of trust most rel-
evant to our computational scenario: trust involves entities,
has a degree, is based on observations and ultimately deter-
mines the interaction among entities. Our model will target
these aspects primarily.
Entities will be referred to as principals. They form
as e tP ranged over by a,b,c,... and p. We assume a
set T of trust values whose elements represent degrees
of trust. These can be simple values, such as {trusted,
distrusted}, or also structured values, e.g. pairs where
the ﬁrst element represents an action, say access a ﬁle, and
the second a trust level associated to that action; or perhaps
vectors whose elements represent benevolence in different
situations.
As trust varies with experience, a model should be ca-
pable of dealing with observations resulting from the prin-
cipal’s interaction with the environment. For clarity, let us
isolate the principal’s trust management from the rest of its
behaviour, and think of each principal as having a “trust
box,” that is an “object” module containing all of its trust
management operations and data. In this paper, we only fo-
cus on the trust box and assume, without loss of generality,
that the remaining parts of the principal interact with it via
appropriately exported methods.
Modelling the Trust Box
Principals’mutualtrustcanbemodelledasafunctionwhich
associates to each pair of principals a trust value t in T :
m :P −→ P −→ T
Function m applied to a and then to b returns the trust value
m(a)(b) ∈ T expressing a’s trust in b. This however does
not mean that a single principal’s trust can be modelled as
a function from P to T , since a’s trust values may depend
on other principals’ values. For instance, a may wish to en-
force that its trust in c is b’s trust in c. Similarly, we may be
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vided somebody we know trusts the sender. This mecha-
nism of relying on third-party assessments, known as del-
egation, is fundamental in all scenarios involving coopera-
tion, including computational paradigms such as GC.
This leads us to a reﬁned view of a principal’s trust as
being deﬁned by a policy. According to such a view, each
principal has a local policy π which contributes by way of
delegation to form the global trust m. A policy expresses
how the principal computes trust information given not just
his own beliefs, but also other principals’ beliefs. It follows
that, as anticipated in the introduction, a’s policy πa has the
type below, whose ﬁrst argument represents the knowledge
of third principals’ policies that a needs to evaluate πa.
πa : (P −→ P −→ T ) −→ (P −→ T )
In this paper we leave unspeciﬁed the way a policy is ac-
tually deﬁned, as this deﬁnitely depends on the application.
We study a relevant example of policy language in §3.
By collecting together the individual policies, we obtain
a function Π  λp :P.πp whose type is (isomorphic to)
Π : (P −→ P −→ T ) −→ (P −→ P −→ T ).
To interpret this collection of mutually recursive local poli-
cies as a global trust function m, we apply some basic
domain theory, namely ﬁxpoints and complete partial or-
ders. We recall below the main notions involved; in general
we assume the reader to be acquainted with partial orders
(cf. [10] for a thorough introduction). Given a partial or-
der (T, ),a nω-chain c is a monotone function from the
set of natural numbers ω to T; that is c =( cn)n∈ω such that
c0   c1   c2   ...
Deﬁnition 1 (CPOs and Continous functions). A partial
order (T, ) is a complete partial order (CPO) if it has a
least element ⊥ and each ω-chain c in T has a least upper
bound

c. A function f between CPOs is continuous if for
each ω-chain c, it holds that

f(c)=f(

c).
The importance of CPOs here is that every continuous
function f : (T, ) → (T, ) on a CPO has a least ﬁxpoint
ﬁx(f) ∈ T, that is a least x such that f(x)=x (cf. [19]). So,
requiring T to be a CPO, which implies that P → P → T
is a CPO too, and taking Π to be continuous, we can deﬁne
the global trust as m  ﬁx(Π), the least ﬁxpoint of Π.
The question arises as to what order to take for  .W e
maintain that it cannot be the order which measures the de-
gree of trust. An example is worth many words. Let T
be the CPO {low ≤ medium ≤ high}, and consider a pol-
icy πa which delegates to b the degree of trust to assign to
c. In this setup, a will assign low trust to c when it is not
able to gather information about c from b. This however
would be an erroneous conclusion, as the interruption in the
ﬂow of information does not bear any ﬁnal meaning about
trust, its most likely cause being a transient network delay
that will soon be resolved. The right conclusion for a to
draw is not to distrust c, but to acknowledge that it does
not know (yet) whether or not to trust c. In other words, if
we want to model dynamic networks, we cannot allow con-
fusion between “don’t trust” and “I don’t know:” the
latter only means lack of evidence for trust or distrust, the
former implies a trust-based, possibly irreversible decision.
In order to make sense of our framework in a GC sce-
nario, we need to acknowledge that principals only have a
partial knowledge of their surroundings and, therefore, of
their own trust values. We thus consider approximate trust
values which embody a level of uncertainty as to which
value we are actually presented with. Speciﬁcally, beside
the usual trust value ordering, we equip trust values with
a trust information ordering. While the former measures
the degree of trustworthiness, the latter measures the de-
gree of uncertainty present in our trust information, that is
its information content. We will assume that the set T of
(approximations of) trust values is a CPO with an ordering
relation  . Then t   t  means that t  “reﬁnes” t, by provid-
ing more information than t about what trust value is being
approximated. With this understanding the continuity of Π
is a very intuitive assumption: it asserts that the better deter-
mined the information from the other principals, the better
determined is value returned by the policy. An example will
help to ﬁx these ideas.
Example 1. Let us reﬁne the set of trust values T dis-
cussed previously by adding some new intermediate values
{⊥,∗,low,medium,high}, and consider the information or-
dering   speciﬁed by the following Hasse diagram.
high medium
*

     
low
⊥

      
Note that this ordering says nothing about what is more
trust. It focus only on the quantity of information a prin-
cipal has. The limit of any chain reﬂects the ﬁnest informa-
tion. The element ∗ represents the uncertainty as to whether
high or medium holds, while ⊥ gives no hint at all about
the actual trust value. Suppose we have a set of principals
P = {a,b,c} with the following policies.
a b c
a high ⊥ ask b
b ∗ high low
c ask b high high
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row gives c’s policy: c’s trust in a is b’s trust in a; c’s trust in
b is high. After a few interactions in which the principals’
exchange their current values, following ﬁxpoint is reached.
a b c
a high ⊥ low
b ∗ high low
c ∗ high high
We reiterate that, importantly, the ordering   is not to be
identiﬁed with the equally essential ordering “more trust.”
2 Trust Structures
Having pointed out the need for order structures equipped
at the same time with an information and a trust ordering, in
this section we focus on the triples (T , , ), which we call
trust structures, and study their basic properties. The notion
of complete lattice, recalled below, will play a relevant role.
Deﬁnition 2 (Complete lattice). A partial order (D,≤) is
a complete lattice if every X ⊆ D has a least upper bound
(lub) and, as a consequence, a greatest lower bound (glb).
We use ∨ and ∧ to denote, respectively, lubs and glbs in
lattices.
When deﬁning a trust management system, it is natural
to start off with a set D of trust values, or degrees. On top
of that, we are likely to need ways to compare and combine
elements of D so as to form, say, a degree which compre-
hends a given set of trust values, or represents the trust level
common to several principals. This amounts to start with
a complete lattice (D,≤), where those combinators can be
considered as taking lubs or glbs of sets of values. To ac-
count for uncertainty, we deﬁne an operator I to extend a
lattice (D,≤) to a trust structure (T , , ). The set T con-
sists of the set of intervals over D which, besides contain-
ing a precise image of D – viz. the singletons – represent
naturally the notion of approximation, or uncertainty about
elements of D.
Interval Construction
We deﬁne now the ordering   which has been already con-
sidered in [14].
Deﬁnition 3. Given a complete lattice (D,≤) and X,Y ⊆D
nonempty subsets we say that X  Y if and only if
∧X ≤∧ Y and ∨X ≤∨ Y
Clearly,   is not a partial order on the subsets of D,a s
the antisymmetry law fails. We get a partial order by con-
sidering as usual the equivalence classes of ∼ =  ∩ .I t
turns out that the intervals over D are a set of representatives
of such classes.
Deﬁnition 4. For (D,≤) a complete lattice, the set I(D)=
{[d0,d1] | d0,d1 ∈ D, d0 ≤ d1}, where [d0,d1]={d|d0 ≤
d ≤ d1} is the interval of D determined by d0 and d1.
Proposition 1. Let X =[ d0,d1] be an interval in D. Then,
∧Xi sd 0 and ∨Xi sd 1.
As a consequence of the proposition above we have that
X ∼[∧X,∨X], forallX ⊆D. Furthermore, [d0,d1]∼[d 
0,d 
1]
implies that d0 = d 
0 and d1 = d 
1. The following lemma
characterises   in terms of ≤.
Lemma 1. For [d0,d1] and [d 
0,d 
1] intervals of D, we have
[d0,d1]   [d 
0,d 
1] if and only if d0 ≤ d 
0 and d1 ≤ d 
1.
We can now show that the lattice structure on (D,≤) is
lifted to a lattice structure (I(D), ) on intervals.
Theorem 1. (I(D), ) is a complete lattice.
Proof. Let S be a subset {[di
0,di
1]|i ∈ J} of I(D), for some
J ⊆ ω. Then

S =[ ∨di
0,∨di
1]. 
We now deﬁne an ordering on intervals which reﬂects
their information contents. Such an ordering will be a CPO
where we base ﬁxpoint computations on. The task is quite
easy: as the interval [d0,d1] expresses a value between d0
and d1, the narrower the interval, the lesser the uncertainty.
This leads directly to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 5. For (D,≤) a complete lattice and X,Y ∈I(D),
deﬁne X  Y ifY ⊆ X.
Analogously to  , we can characterise   in terms of ≤.
Lemma 2. For [d0,d1] and [d 
0,d 
1] intervals of D, we have
that [d0,d1]   [d 
0,d 
1] if and only if d0 ≤ d 
0 and d 
1 ≤ d1.
Finally, as for the previous ordering, we have the follow-
ing result.
Theorem 2. (I(D), ) is a CPO.
Proof. The least element of (I(D), )is D=[∧D,∨D]. The
lub of an ω-chain [dn
0,dn
1]n is

[dn
0,dn
1]n =[ ∨dn
0,∧dn
1]. 
The trust structures above give a method to model trust
based systems. We remark that intervals are a natural way
to express partial information: trust in a principal is [d0,d1]
when it could be any value between d0 and d1.
Example 2 (Intervals in [0,1]). Let R stand for the set of
reals between 0 and 1, which is a complete lattice with the
usualordering≤, andletusconsiderthesetI(R)ofintervals
in R. It follows from the previous results that (I(R), ) is
a complete lattice and (I(R), ) is a complete partial order.
The trust domain so obtained is particularly interesting, as it
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lated to the uncertainty logic [13], where an interval [d0,d1]
in I(R) is seen as a pair of numbers where d0 is called belief
and 1−d1 disbelief. Although a formal comparison with
Jøsang’s logic is beyond the scope of our presentation, in
the following we shall rework a few simple examples from
[13] in the present framework.
An important property of (I(D), , ) is stated below.
Theorem 3. Relation   is continuous with respect to  
and, conversely, relation   is continuous with respect to  .
Lifting Operators
The continuity of the function Π is an important require-
ment. This property depends on the operators used with the
policies. In the sequel we give a useful result, with respect
to our interval construction, which allows us to lift contin-
uous operators in the original lattice (D,≤) to continuous
operators in (I(D), ) and (I(D), ).
Deﬁnition 6. For (D,≤) and (D ,≤ ) complete lattices and
f :D−→ D  a continuous function, let I(f):I(D)−→ I(D )
be the pointwise extension of f deﬁned as
I(f)([d0,d1]) = [f(d0), f(d1)].
Note that in this deﬁnition the continuity of f ensures
that I(f) is well deﬁned.
An ω-cochain in a complete lattice (D,≤), is an anti-
monotone function c : ω → T, that is a function such that
i ≤ j implies cj ≤ ci. A function f : (D,≤) −→ (D ,≤ ) is
co-continuous iff for each ω-cochain c in D, it holds that 
f(c)=f(

c); f is bi-continuous if it is continuous and
co-continuous.
The following proposition states that all ω-cochains in
(I(D), ) have glbs.
Proposition 2. Let [dn
0,dn
1] be an ω-cochain in (I(D), ).
Then  [dn
0,dn
1]=[ ∧dn
0,∨dn
1].
Proof. Symmetric to that of Theorem 2. 
We can now give the following result about lifted func-
tions in trust structures.
Theorem 4. For (D,≤) and (D ,≤ ) complete lattices and
f : D −→ D  a bi-continuous function, the pointwise exten-
sion I(f) is bi-continuous with respect to both the informa-
tion and the trust orderings.
Proof. Easy, from the deﬁnition of I(f), together with The-
orems 1 and 2 and with the bi-continuity of f. 
In the following examples we show how to apply the pre-
vious theorem to some interesting operators.
Example 3 (Lub and glb operators). The most natural op-
erators, regarding lattices, are lub and glb. It is easy to see
that they are bi-continuous in a complete lattice (D,≤). Ex-
ploiting Theorem 4 we can now state that lub and glb with
respect to   are bi-continuous over (I(D), ).
Example 4 (Multiplication and Sum). When considering
the interval construction over R, as in Example 2, we can
extend the operators of sum (weighted) and multiplication
over the intervals. In fact, given two intervals [d0,d1] and
[d 
0,d 
1], the product is deﬁned as
[d0,d1]·[d 
0,d 
1]=[ d0·d 
0,d1·d 
1],
which is exactly the extension of multiplication over reals.
Similarly we can deﬁne sum as
[d0,d1]+[d 
0,d 
1]=[ d0+d 
0−d0·d 
0,d1+d 
1−d1·d 
1].
These operations appear in [13] under the names of con-
junction and disjunction.
Example 5 (A non-lifted operator: Discounting). Dis-
counting, as deﬁned in [13], is an operator which weighs
the trust value received from a delegation according to the
trust in the delegated principal.
[d0,d1][d 
0,d 
1]=[ d0·d 
0,1−d0·(1−d 
1)]
2.1 Product and Function Constructors
Our model should satisfy “context dependent” trust. By this
we mean that trusting a principal a to obtain information
about restaurants does not mean that we trust a about, say,
sailing. We can accommodate this kind of situation using a
simplepropertyoflatticesandCPO’s. Namely, wecanform
products of trust structures where each component accounts
for a particular context. For instance, using a domain of
the form Restaurants×Sailing will allow us to distinguish
about a’s dependability on the two issues of our example.
The next theorem shows that extending the orders pointwise
to products and function spaces gives the result we need.
Theorem 5. Given two complete lattices (D,≤), (D ,≤ )
and a generic set X then
1. I(D×D ) is isomorphic to I(D)×I(D );
2. X −→ I(D) is isomorphic to I(X −→ D).
Proof. In both cases we have to show that there exists a bi-
jective correspondence which preserves the orderings. For
(1) the bijection is
[(d0,d 
0),(d1,d 
1)]
∼  −→ ([d0,d1],[d 
0,d 
1]).
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witnessed realised by the mutually inverse mappings below.
[f0, f1]
∼  −→ λx.[f0(x), f1(x)]
g
∼  −→ [λx.∧g(x),λx.∨g(x)]
Remark 1. Theorem 4 holds for any bi-continuous function
f : D0 ×...×Dn −→ D. The pointwise lifting of f gives
a function I(f) : I(D0 ×...×Dn) −→ I(D) and from the
result above we have that I(f) is (isomorphic to) a function
F : I(D0)×...×I(Dn) −→ I(D).
3 A Policy Language
Following our discussion we propose to operate with a lan-
guage for trust policies capable of expressing intervals, del-
egation, and a set of function constructions. We exemplify
the approach by studying the simple policy language below.
Syntax
The language consists of the following syntactic categories,
parametric over a ﬁxed trust lattice (D,≤).
π ::= p (delegation)
| λx :P. τ (abstraction)
p ::= a ∈P (principal)
| x :P (vars)
τ ::=[ d,d] ∈ I(D) (value/var)
| π(p) (policy value)
| e  → τ;τ (choice)
| op(τ1...τn) (lattice op)
e ::= p = p (equality)
| e bop e (boolean op)
Here op is a continuous function over (I(D), ), and bop is
a standard boolean operator. The elements of the category
p are either principals or variables. The main syntactic cat-
egory is π: it can be either delegation to another principal
or a λ-abstraction. An element of τ can be an interval, the
application of a policy, a conditional or the application of
a continuous operator op. The elements of e are boolean
functions applied to equalities between elements of P.
It is worth noticing that such a simple language goes be-
yond delegation interpreted strictly. In fact, rather that al-
lowing principals to merely delegate somebody to decide
on their behalf, it allows them to consults with each other to
form complex, informed trust judgements. The examples to
follow will clarify this concept.
Semantics
We provide a formal semantics for the language described
above. As pointed out before, π is a policy. Hence the se-
mantic domain, as described in §1, will be the codomain of
the function
[[π]] σ : (P −→ P −→ T ) −→ (P −→ T ),
where σ is an assignment of values in P to variables. The
semantic function [[·]] σ is deﬁned by structural induction on
the syntax of π as follows.
[[p]] σm = m([ p]) σm;
[[λx : P. τ]] σm = λp :P.([τ]) σ{p/x}m.
Here ([·]) σm is a(n overloaded) function which given an as-
signment σ and a global trust function m : P −→ P −→ T
maps elements of p, τ, and e respectively to the semantic
domains P, I(D), and Bool as follows.
([ [d0,d1]] ) σm =[ d0,d1]
([π(p)])σm =[ [ π]] σm([ p]) σm
([e  → τ1;τ2]) σm = if ([e]) σm then ([τ1]) σm else ([τ2]) σm
([op(τ1...τn)])σm = op(([τ1]) σm,...,([τn]) σm)
([a]) σm = a ([x]) σm = σ(x)
([ p1 = p2]) σm =( [p1]) σm =( [p2]) σm
([e1 bop e2]) σm =( [ e1]) σm bop ([e2]) σm
Let {πp}p∈P be a an arbitrary collection of all policies,
where πp = λx : P. ⊥ for all but a ﬁnite number of princi-
pals. The ﬁxpoint semantics of {πp}p∈P is the global trust
function determined by the collection of individual policies,
and it is readily expressed in terms of [[·]] σ:
{[ {πp}p∈P ]}σ = ﬁx(λm.λp.[[πp]] σm).
We believe that this policy language is sufﬁciently ex-
pressive for most application scenarios in GC, as supported
by the following examples. Note however that our ap-
proach generalises to any choice of underlying trust struc-
ture (T , , ), provided the operators used in the policy
language are continuous with respect to the information or-
dering.
Example 6 (Read and Write access). Let D={N,W,R,RW}
represent the access rights to principal’s CVs. The set D is
ordered by the relation ≤
∀d ∈ D.N ≤ d and ∀d ∈ D.d ≤ RW.
Let us consider how to express some simple policies in our
language. The following policy says that LIZ’s trust in BOB
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Instead, LIZ’s trust in CARL will depend on her trust in BOB:
if it is above [W,W] then [R,RW] otherwise [N,RW].
πLIZ = λx :P.
x = BOB  → [W,RW]∨LIZ(CARL);
x = CARL  →
([W,W]   LIZ(BOB)  → [R,RW];[N,RW]);
[N,RW]
This policy can be made dependent on someone else’s
belief. For instance, the above judgement about BOB is
merged below with PAUL’s belief (weighed by discounting).
πLIZ = λx :P.
x = BOB  → [N,W]∨LIZ(CARL)
∨LIZ(PAUL)PAUL(x);
x = CARL  →
([W,W]   LIZ(BOB)  → [R,RW];[N,RW]);
[N,RW]
In this case LIZ’s trust in PAUL is the bottom value [N,RW]
which is going to be the left argument of the discounting
operator .
Example 7 (Spam Filter). Let R be as in Example 2.
We illustrate some policies modelling ﬁlters for blocking
spam emails. The set of principals P is the set of In-
ternet domains from which we could receive emails, e.g.
daimi.au.dk. A starting policy, where we suppose that
our server spam.filter.edu knows no one, could be
π1 = λx :P. x = spam.filter.edu  → [1,1];[0,1],
meaning that only internal emails are trusted. It could
happen that spam.filter.edu starts interacting with other
principals. A likely event is that it receives a list of other
universities’ Internet domains, and decides to trust them to
a large extent, and actually use their beliefs. We could have
π2 = λx :P. x ∈ UniList  → [.75,1];

y∈UniList
y(x) ∨ π1(x),
where we suppose that “∈” stands for a chain of nested con-
ditionals for all the elements of UniList. Let us suppose now
that the ﬁlter receives emails from a certain number of sus-
picious addresses, and would like to single them out and
enforce a special treatment for them. The policy could be
updated as
π3 = λx :P. x ∈ BadList  → [0,.5]; π2(x).
The spam-ﬁlter could then decide to add a new level of bad-
ness and create the new list VeryBadList. At the same time,
it would like to change the policy for BadList putting certain
restrictions on the intervals returned as other universities’
opinions.
π4 = λx :P.
x ∈ VeryBadList  → [0,.2];
x ∈ BadList  → π2(x)∧[0,.5];
π2(x).
As illustrated in the Spam Filter example, we see trust
evolution as being modelled by suitable updates of policies,
as response to, e.g., observations of principal behaviour.
However, it is still not clear exactly what update primitives
are required in practice. We are currently working on de-
veloping a calculus of of trust and principal behaviour, with
features for trust policy updates We will return on this in the
concluding section.
Example 8 (Reputation Based Systems). The work [20]
presents a reputation-based model of trust, where each prin-
cipal a has an associated history Ha of observations, or
events. A history (e1,...,en) indicates that event ei has hap-
pened after events e1,...,ei−1, for all i. A principal can
provide information to the others (a.k.a. ‘recommending’)
based on its past history. This means that it is not trust be-
ing propagated between principals, but observations. Rep-
utation is then deﬁned to be (as a formula satisﬁed) when a
principal has never been observed to ignore certain condi-
tions, i.e., if it never misused a resource.
Our approach is ﬂexible enough to express some of this.
(A full treatment requires the integration of policy updates
in the policy language.) The idea is to make history part of
a policy π, so that a principal’s trust decision process can
be deﬁned in terms of its own and other principals’ past ob-
servations. Let us consider the example of a peer-to-peer
ﬁle distribution system discussed in [20]. In such scenario,
users are allowed to download provided that they allows at
least one upload every three downloads. Let B be the set of
ordered boolean values, with ﬀ ≤ tt, and let N• be the set
of natural numbers completed with a top element ∞. Histo-
ries are elements of H =P → N•×N•, i.e. functions which
assign to principals the numbers of uploads and downloads
they performed in the past. Then, a’s trust function πa is of
the kind
P → H → B
where we understand that a after a history h trusts x to
download if πa(x)(h) yields tt. The SERVer’s policy can
be written as follows in a suitable “sugared” version of our
language:
πSERV = λp :P.λh : H. let (u,d)=h(p) in d ≤ 3u.
If access is granted, h is updated in view of the next invoca-
tion by increasing p’s count of downloads and, correspond-
ingly, its peer’s count of uploads.
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We presented a novel model for trust in distributed dy-
namic networks, such as those considered in Global Com-
puting. The model builds on basic ideas from trust manage-
ment systems and relies on domain theory to provide a se-
mantic model for the interpretation of trust policies in trust-
based security systems. Our technical contribution is based
bi-ordered structures (T , , ), where the information or-
dering   measures the information contents of data, and is
needed to compute the ﬁxpoint of mutually recursive poli-
cies, while the trust ordering   measures trust degrees and
is used to make trust-informed decisions. Trust and infor-
mation orderings, as relations, are continuous with respect
to each other. Following this lead, we presented an interval
construction as a canonical way to add uncertainty to trust
lattices, and used the theory to guide the design and under-
pin the semantics of a simple, yet realistic policy language.
We believe that the model can be used to explain existing
trust-based systems, as well as help the design of new ones.
We based our investigation on the notion of (complete)
lattice, since it is the standard in the literature. However,
there are reasons to believe that upper semilattices – that
is ordered structures in which only bounded sets have least
upper bounds – provide a better starting model. From a
modelling perspective, it is easy to think of situations in
which it should not be possible to form the join of two trust
level. For instance, in a starship’s auto-destruction system,
the capabilities “possess key A” and “possess key B”t oi g -
nite cannot be joined, as the capability of possessing both
the keys is not contemplated in the system. From a theoreti-
cal point of view, the absence of a top element simpliﬁes the
development of trust structures and enriches their theory.
We remark that the constructions illustrated here can be
understood in abstract (categorical) terms. We have chosen
to spell them out in set theoretical details to reach a wider
audience. Inparticular, lookingatthepartialorder(D,≤)as
a category, our interval construction I can be seen as the free
construction of a double category with all ω-ﬁltered colim-
its. Speciﬁcally,  and arerespectivelythehorizontaland
vertical arrows, while least upper bounds and their (mutual)
commutation laws are expressed by as colimits. Further-
more, the (I(D), ) component of the interval construction
is exactly the functor category Arr →D, where Arr =•→•
is the category with due objects and one non-identity arrow
between them. More generally, the construction is related
to the Yoneda embedding, as the image of the hom-functor
HomD : Dop×D → Set is (I(D), ). Starting from these
observations, we are currently investigating abstract char-
acterisations of the trust structures arising from the present
work.
We are clearly still at the ﬁrst steps of development,
where we need to assess the generality of our approach
by applying it to various scenarios. Regarding semantics,
we aim at a theory to account for the dynamic modiﬁca-
tion of the “web of trust,” as for instance occurs when a
principal updates its trust policy. Such modiﬁcations intro-
duce an element of non-monotonicity that we plan to in-
vestigate by extending our model with a “possible-world”
semantics, where updating a policy marks the transition to
a “new world” and triggers a (partial) re-computation of the
global trust function.
One of the main challenges ahead is to complement
the denotational model introduced here with an operational
model. In developing such a model we will need for in-
stance to address the question of how to compute trust in-
formation efﬁciently over the global network. The highly
dynamic nature of the kind of networks we are interested
in, and their lack of any central control whatsoever pose
serious challenges. In many applications it will not be fea-
sible or necessary at all to compute exact values: we thus
aim at techniques which allow to compute sufﬁcient ap-
proximations to trust values. One issue is, as mentioned
above, the update of computed trust elements; it would be
interesting to investigate dynamic algorithms to update the
least ﬁxpoint computation yielding the global trust function.
Another important issue is trust negotiation, whereby re-
quester and granter engage in complex protocols aimed to
convince each other of their reciprocal trustworthiness (for
the speciﬁc purpose at hand), without disclosing more evi-
dence than necessary. Similar ideas appear in the literature
as “proof carrying authentication” [1] and “automated trust
negotiation” [23].
In order to focus on the operational mechanisms of trust
evolution and propagation in a distributed setting, we are
currently working on a calculus of trust where principals’
behaviour is accounted for. The approach is in the style
of process algebras. Each principal is identiﬁed by a triple
a{ { {A} } }π, where a is the principal’s name, A the behaviour
which models its actions, and π its trust policy, described
in a language such as the one presented in this paper. The
dynamics of the calculus consists of interactions between
principals, as for instance in:
a{ { {b( ( (x) ) )A| | | A } } }π | | | b{ { {a e . . .B| | | B } } }π 
      a{ { {A{e/x}| | | A } } }π | | | b{ { {B| | | B } } }π .
Such interactions are granted according to the involved
principals’ policies. Furthermore, principals can take de-
cisions based on their trust policies and – most importantly
– update their policies, as e.g.
a{ { {[ [ [ζ] ] ]. . .A| | | B} } }π       a{ { {A| | | B} } }ζ(π),
where ζ is a suitable “policy transformer.” The overall idea
here is that policy updates are informed during a’s evolu-
tion in time by its history of (un)successful interactions with
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ter further:
a{ { {b(x). . .(x = k)? ? ?[ [ [ζ1] ] ]: : :[ [ [ζ2] ] ]} } }π | | | b{ { {[d0,d1]   π (a)? ? ?a k : : :0 0 0} } }π 
Here a and b run in parallel. Principal a is willing to receive
a message from b and, depending on whether or not the
received value is the expected k, it will update its policy π
by ζ1 or by ζ2. On the other hand, b will attempt to interact
with a (and send k) depending on whether its current trust
in a is above the threshold [d0,d1].
Our current work on such extended framework attempts
to capture the evolutionary aspects of trust in dynamic net-
works, together with the study of properties and related
analysis techniques of systems based on trust in such net-
works. A particular locus of activity regards the formula-
tion of type systems for the static control of trust. For in-
stance, one may want to guarantee that at any moment in
time the opportunity of an interaction between a{ { {A} } }π and
b{ { {B} } }π  can only present itself if the interaction is granted
by the policies, say e.g. if ⊥≺π(b) and ⊥≺π (a).
Finally, we are also investigating ways for expressing
and studying security properties of systems based on dy-
namic trust evolution and propagation, such as those above.
Among the many approaches to checking of security prop-
erties, behavioural equivalences are particularly appealing.
A valid alternative could be designing a logic for expressing
properties of principals.
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